"The CCRC referred his case to this court because, following the decision of the House of Lords in Morgan Smith [2001] 1 AC 146, and given a new assertion that the appellant had been the victim of childhood sexual abuse, there was doubt that the issue of provocation had properly been before the jury..."

"This appeal raised the issue of whether a judge of the Crown Court had correctly exercised his jurisdiction to determine, after the conclusion of a trial of a defendant, an allegation that the defendant was in contempt of court because he had intimidated a witness outside the Crown Court during the course of the trial."

"If a judge decides to leave to a jury the question whether a defendant has discharged the evidential burden of raising sufficient persuasive evidence that she did not know or suspect that the substance of which she had possession was a controlled drug, as well as the question of whether the Crown has discharged the legal burden of proving that the defendant did in fact know or had reason to suspect that the substance was a controlled drug, a much more careful direction is needed than that supplied by the judge."

"In Mr. Tedd's submission a person cannot be said to make an illegal image if, when using his computer to browse the internet, he intentionally accesses an web site comprised of lawful, albeit pornographic, material, but without further action on his part the programming associated with the site causes illegal material to "pop up" or results in access to sites which contain illegal material."

"Counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted at the end of the prosecution case that, even on the prosecution's evidence, the count charged was not made out because the words used had not been spoken immediately before the incident of assault so as to justify the conclusion that the racially aggravated form of the offence had been committed."

"The appellant contended that the offence of outraging public decency as developed by the nineteenth century cases was confined to cases where a lewd act was in fact witnessed by at least one person; and that the public element was satisfied if in addition at least one other person witnessed or could have seen the act. As no one saw the appellant in the act of filming, no one saw a lewd act; public decency could not have been outraged; therefore no offence was committed."

"Mr Beharrylal... accepts that the relevant statutory provisions, have, so far, been interpreted by the courts so as to impose what has been described as strict liability. He submits, however, that these authorities are not, when analysed, entirely satisfactory. As a result, he submits, this court should now revisit the proper interpretation of the section bearing in mind, in particular, what he describes as a change in legal climate represented by the cases of B –v- Director of Public Prosecution [2000] 2 AC 428; R –v- K [2001] 3 All ER 897; and R –v- G [2004] 1AC 1034. Further, he submits, both Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights support the proposition that the relevant statutory provision should not be read so as to impose strict liability."

"The appeal... is concerned with the liability for murder or manslaughter of a secondary party who has withdrawn from the attack on the victim prior to its conclusion."

"The essential problem in this case is the relevance to the conviction, if any, of section 76 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and the conclusive presumptions which it provides in relation to consent in sexual cases. If none, section 74 and section 75, with its evidential presumptions, arise for consideration."

"At the heart of this reference is the CCRC's submission that a woman can only be convicted of infanticide under section 1(1) of the Infanticide Act 1938 if all the ingredients of murder are proved, in particular if the mens rea for murder is proved, namely an intention to kill or to cause really serious bodily harm."